How can PM Abe sell the SDF to Japanese?
- Xiaotong Liu

- Oct 1, 2018
- 5 min read
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, in his news conference for celebrating his election victory, dismissed a suggestion that he would set a deadline of 2020 to change the most controversial part of the constitution, Article 9, which renounces war and prohibits an army,. Abe's suggestion has majority supporters in the government: according to a survey jointly conducted by The Asahi Shimbun, more than 80 percent of the new Lower House members from across the political spectrum support amending the pacifist Constitution.
Japanese public opinion, however, is not as confident as the government. According to a nationwide survey in 2017, many people recognized the role Article 9 has played in maintaining the nation's pacifist stance, with 75 percent of respondents saying the clause has enabled the country to avoid becoming embroiled in conflicts abroad since World War II. Former defense minister Shigeru Ishiba, a member of Abe's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and a vocal proponent of rewriting the constitution, said in an interview that it had proved "extremely difficult" to mobilize citizens behind the issue.
Any changes to the constitution require majority approval from the public in a referendum. Abe is facing to convince Japanese society to amend Article 9.
One of the most controversial problems is where and how the government employs the Self-Defense Force (SDF). Activities within Japanese territory are fair game, and even discussion of expanded capabilities like the purchase of Tomahawks will not affect the constitutional debate. According to the "Public Opinion Survey on the SDF and Defense Issues" from the Public Relations Office of the Cabinet Office in 2015, disaster rescue (e.g. rescue activities in a disaster and emergency patient transportation), ensuring national safety (e.g. safety in the surrounding sea/air space, such as the response to attack on the islands), and domestic security are the first three reasons that Japanese believe Japan should have the SDF. In this survey, 84.6 percent think that the status quo, which means keeping the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan and the current size of the SDF, is enough to keep Japan's national security.
In this situation, the SDF seems like armed police for Japan public. The public does not want the SDF to get involved in international issues. An enhanced police force is not enough for Abe. No matter whether Japanese like it or not, the reason for Abe to rewrite Article 9 is not only for self-defense. Where the administration will encounter friction is if it employs the SDF in new international operations or deploys forces to areas where combat is perceived to be taking place. For example, the main question here is whether South China Sea operations will be considered contentious within the debate. Specific activities are considered benign, such as multilateral exercises, but any dispatch of the SDF outside of exercises in the South China Sea or Southeast Asia will likely be reactive and opportunistic, rather than proactive.
Thus, how to reform the public impression of the SDF is vital to Abe.
First, Abe needs to persuade the public that defense initiatives are essential. One of the best ways to keep public support for defense initiatives is broadcasting the external threat. The LDP's primary argument for the constitutional amendment is that the increasingly severe security environment demands a change to Article 9. To reinforce that argument, Abe needs to highlight the threats. For instance, whether or not a North Korean provocation is significant, the Abe administration will continue to get in front of the public every time to remind the society of the dire threat that North Korea poses. Another example is the sovereignty dispute of the Diaoyu Islands with China in the East China Sea. However, overemphasizing this issue may not help Abe. After the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs created a website in support of its claims of Diaoyu Islands' belonging in 2012, China pressured Japan by the economy, military and public opinions. The Chinese government set barriers for Japanese products export to China, and Chinese people boycotted Japanese products. These actions gave the Japanese economy a very negative influence. Thus, a part of the Japanese public opposes the amendment of the constitution because they are afraid that further actions on SDF will irritate China and escalate tension.
Second, Abe can diminish the reliability of United States Forces Japan (USFJ) to stress the importance of the SDF. The tension between Okinawa residents and USFJ is a good excuse. In 1995, the abduction and rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl by two U.S. Marines and one U.S. sailor led to demands for the removal of all U.S. military bases in Japan. The crimes committed by U.S. service members continue in Okinawa. The latest crime was on February 12, 2018. Some U.S. navy personnel were suspected of importing and distributing illegal narcotics, as well as selling them to Japanese citizens. The survey above shows that the Japanese care about domestic security. It is a question for the public whether USFJ can ensure Japan keeping a stable and normal life.
Third, Abe can sell the SDF to the domestic public with a harmless public image to decrease the public tension. In the 2015 survey, the younger generation showed less concern than the older generation about self-defense. Educating and recruiting the the younger generation to SDF is a problem. The government tries to utilize a web of effective cultural and entertainment resources - the Creative Industrial Complex - to influence public perceptions of Japan's military establishment. Starting from the comic series Prince Pickles, which sought to describe the ideal "journey to peace," and an initiative to publish official defense white papers in manga format for general consumption, the SDF started using the popular culture of kawaii manga. The SDF incorporated "cute" throughout its recruiting and public relations campaigns to pacify and negate the perception of Japan’s violent past and fears about the future while also selling its role as a competent protector of Japan.
The cute illustrations have long played the role of indirect communicators, who could break tension and mediate conflict in public. Thus, kawaii mascots, whether mini-skirted girls or bunny-rabbit decoy launchers, can be a way to defuse the very touchy issues surrounding the military's presence.
Furthermore, a harmless public image can also be a way for outside observers to predict the success of the government’s effort to sell the SDF. It is time to worry when the SDF abandon their kawaii mask because that would signal that citizens and soldiers had made their peace with the subject.
Another observation in the 2015 survey is most of the participants did not have a clear acknowledgment of what is going on. When asked about the questions "Do you think the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan helps Japan's security or not?", 44.4 percent chose the answer: "if there must be an answer, I would think the treaty is useful." When it came to the question "Do you think there is potential that Japan may get involved in a war?", 47.2 percent chose the answer: "if there must be an answer, I would think there is a potential." These kinds of questions showed that the Japanese populace did not have a clear attitude about whether Japan was safe or not. Or maybe they were avoiding giving an answer since the situation was a dilemma. If Abe can be more sophisticated in reforming public opinion, he might achieve his goal by 2020.
References:
1. Michael MacArthur Bosack. May 26, 2017. Japan's Path to Constitutional Amendment. The Diplomat
2. 内閣府政府広報室. 平成27年3月.「自衛隊・防衛問題 に関する世論調査」の概要Public Relations Office of the Cabinet Office. Mar, 2015. Public Opinion Survey on the SDF and Defense Issues
3. Kyodo. Apr 30, 2017. Japanese sharply divided over revising Article 9 amid regional security threats, poll finds. The Japan Times
4. The Asahi Shimbun. Oct 23, 2017. VOTE 2017: Constitutional revision backed by over 80% of Lower House. The Asahi Shimbun
5. Adam Taylor. October 24, 2017. Changing Japan's pacifist constitution won't be easy for Abe. The Washington Post
6. Matt Alt. Nov 30, 2015. Japan's cute Army. The New Yorker
7. Matthew Burmmer. Jan 19, 2016. Japan: The Manga Military. The Diplomat







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